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Proposed Amendment on Presidential
Inability and Vice-Presidential Vacancy
After eighty years of study and debate by scholars and politicians,
the Congress has finally submitted to the states a Constitutional amend-
ment to remedy a glaring flaw in the Constitution. Mr. Feerick sets
forth the text of the proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment and explains
the thinking of its sponsors.
by John D. Feerick e of the New York Bar (New York City)
A RTICLE II, Section 1, Clause 6 of
the Constitution provides:
In case of the Removal of the Presi-
dent from Office, or of his Death, Res-
ignation, or Inability to discharge the
Powers and Duties of the said Office,
the Same shall devolve on the Vice
President, and the Congress may by
Law provide for the case of Removal,
Death, Resignation or Inability. both
of the President and Vice President,
declaring what Officer shall then act
as President, and such Officer shall act
accordingly, until the Disability be
removed, or a President shall be
elected.
This language does not answer some
critical questions:
(1) In a case of Presidential inability
does the Vice President succeed to the
"office" of President thereby becoming
President for the remainder of the term.,
or does he succeed to the "powers and
duties" of President thereby becoming
Acting President for the period of in.
ability ?
(2) Who is authorized to determine
the existence of an inability and its
termination ?
Further, this provision does not set
out any procedure for filling a vacancy
in the Vice Presidency: nor does any
other part of the Constitution.
Between the years 1787 and 1965
several Presidents were disabled in
office and eight died in office. 1 Seven
Vice Presidents also died in office and
one resigned.2  These occurrences
revealed two glaring flaws in our Con-
stitutional system: the absence of
procedures to deal with a case of Presi-
dential inability and the lack of means
to fill a vacancy occurring in the Vice
Presidency.
An Amendment
at Last
After more than eighty years of
study by Congressional committees,
attorneys general, constitutional ex-
perts and bar committees, the United
States Congress on July 6, 1965, pro-
posed a long-needed Constitutional
amendment to eliminate the void in
these areas. 3 Sponsored in the Senate
by Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana and
eighty-four cosponsors and in the
House of Representatives by Repre-
sentatives Emanuel Celler of New York,
William M. McCulloch of Ohio, Rich-
ard H. Poff of Virginia and others,
supported by the American Bar Asso-
ciation4 and by bar associations and
civic organizations throughout the
country, and wholeheartedly endorsed
by President Lyndon B. Johnson, the
proposed amendment probably has
received greater support and more con-
sideration than any other amendment
in our history. It stands as a striking
example of bipartisan action in the
best interests of the nation.
The proposed amendment, which
has been submitted to the fifty state
legislatures for ratification as the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, provides:
Section 1. In case of the removal of
the President from office or of his
death or resignation, the Vice Presi-
dent shall become President.
Section 2. Whenever there is a va-
cancy in the office of the Vice Presi-
dent, the President shall nominate a
Vice President who shall take office
1. These events are described in the author's
book, Faom FAILING HANDs; TsiE STORY or
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION (Fordham University
Press, 1965).
2. The Vice Presidency has been vacant for a
total of thirty-seven years, three months and
two days.
3. The proposal passed the House of Repre-
sentatives by voice vote on June 30, 1965, and
the Senate by a vote of 68 to 5 on July 6, 1965
The same measure, with a few differences,
previously had passed the Senate on February
19, 1965, by a vote of 72 to 0, and the House on
April 13, 1965, by a vote of 368 to 29.
4. The principles embodied in the proposed
amendment were recommended in January,
1964, by an American Bar Association Confer-
enee on Presidential Inability and Succession.
The background to and the work at this con-
ference are described in the author's book at
pages 237-257 and his article Presidentia In-
ability: The Problem and Solutio", 50 A.B.A.J.
321 (1964). See also, 50 A.B.A.J. 237 (1964).
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upon confirmation by a majority vote
of both Houses of Congress.
Section 3. Whenever the President
transmits to the President pro tempore
of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives his written
declaration that he is unable to dis-
charge the powers and duties of his
office, and until he transmits to them a
written declaration to the contrary,
such powers and duties shall be dis-
charged by the Vice President as Act-
ing President.
Section 4. Whenever the Vice Presi-
dent and a majority of either the prin-
cipal officers of the executive depart-
ments or of such other body as Con-
gress may by law provide, transmit to
the President pro tempore of the Sen-
ate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declara-
tion that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his
office, the Vice President shall im-
mediately assume the powers and
duties of the office as Acting Presi-
dent.
Thereafter, when the President
transmits to the President pro tempore
of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives his written
declaration that no inability exists, he
shall resume the powers and duties of
his office unless the Vice President and
a majority of either the principal
officers of the executive department or
of such other body as Congress may
by law provide, transmit within four
days to the President pro tempore of
the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is un-
able to discharge the powers and duties
of his office. Thereupon Congress shall
decide the issue, assembling within
forty-eight hours for that purpose if
not in session. If the Congress, within
twenty-one days after receipt of the
latter written declaration, or, if Con-
gress is not in session, within twenty-
one days after Congress is required to
assemble, determines by two-thirds vote
of both Houses that the President is un-
able to discharge the powers and duties
of his office, the Vice President shall
continue to discharge the same as Act-
ing President; otherwise, the President
shall resume the powers and duties of
his office.
The measure is in the form of a
proposed Constitutional amendment
rather than a statute because of the
predominant view among Constitution-
al authorities that Congress has no
power to legislate on Presidential in-
ability, or to establish a means for
filling a vacancy in the Vice Presiden-
cy. An amendment setting out specific
procedures was chosen over a short
enabling amendment so that it would
be self-executing and consistent with
the Constitution's specificity in matters
involving the Presidency.
Section 1 is designed to give express
constitutional recognition to the prec-
edent that a Vice President becosnes
President when there is a vacancy in
the Presidential office because of the
President's death, resignation or resnov-
al. When President William Henry
Harrison died in office in 1841, Vice
President John Tyler assumed the
Presidential office despite vigorous
objection that the Constitution intend-
ed that he remain Vice President and
merely discharge the powers and du-
ties of the Presidency. The Tyler prec-
edent has been followed in turn by
Vice Presidents Millard Fillmore,
Andrew Johnson, Chester A. Arthur,
Theodore Roosevelt, Calvin Coolidge,
Harry S. Truman and Lyndon B. John-
son.
Section 2 deals with the problem of
the Vice-Presidential vacancy. It would
cover two sets of contingencies: (1)
when the Vice President succeeds to
the Presidency upon the President's
death, resignation or removal; and
(2) when the Vice President dies,
resigns or is removed. In any of these
cases, the President would nominate a
Vice President who would take office
upon confirmation by a majority vote
of both Houses of Congress. each
House meeting separately. If a nomi-
nee were not confirmed, the President
would be expected to nominate another
person.
Since the effectiveness of a Vice
President depends almost completely
on his relationship with the President,
this method of filling a vacancy would
insure that the President obtained a
Vice President with whom he could
work-one of the same party, of com-
patible temperament and views. It has
other merits. The Presidential candi-
date now selects his running mate, so
the procedure would be consistent to a
large extent with present practice. As
the people must give their stamp of
approval to the Presidential and Vice
Presidential candidates in order for
them to be elected, so, too, here their
representatives in Congress would have
to give their approval to the Presi-
dent's nominee before he could become
the new Vice President.
Section 3 would permit a President
to declare himself disabled and, in that
event, to declare the end of his disabil-
ity. The Vice President would act as
President during the interim. This
provision would eliminate the ambign.
ous wording of the succession provi-
sion which made it practically impossi-
ble for Vice Presidents Chester A.
Arthur and Thomas R. Marshall to
assume Presidential power during the
inabilities of Presidents James A.
Garfield and Woodrow Wilson, respec-
tivcly, for fear that if they did so, the
President would be ousted from office
for the remainder of the term. The
ambiguity lay in the words "the
Same", which devolved on the Vice
President in every case either the
"office" or the "powers and duties" of
President. Tyler had interpreted "the
Same" as meaning "the office" and
therefore, the argument went, "the
office" would devolve on the Vice Pres-
ident in a case of inability as well as of
death. Under Section 3 a President
actually would be encouraged to relin-
quish his powers and duties if he were
aware that he was disabled or could
foresee that he would be.5
Section 4 is intended to cover situa-
tions in which the President is unable to
declare his ou n inability or in which he
refuses to do so when disabled. The
proposed amendment would empower
the Vice President and a majority of
the "principal officers of the executive
departments" 7  (popularly known as
"the Cabinet") to declare the Presi-
dent disabled. Should unforeseen cir-
cumstances indicate that the Cabinet is
not a workable body in this matter,
5, A President's voluntary declaration could
cover "either an indefinite or a specified period
of time, and could specify a particular hour of
commencement of the Vice President's role as
Acting President". Hearnosg Before the House
Judiciary Committee, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. at
240 (1965) (testimony of former Attorney Gen-
eral Herbert Browncll).
6- "Inability" is intended to cover any state
of facts that would cause a President to be
unable to discharge the powers and duties of
his office, such as mental or physical illness,
kidnaping, wartime capture or an airplane
crash in an inaccessible location.
7. This expression is used in Article It, Sec-
tion 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution. and it
refers to the Secretaries of State; Treasury; and
Defense; the Attorney General; the Postmaster
General; and the Secretaries of the Interior;
Agriculture; Commerce; Labor: Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare; and Housing and Urban
Development.
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Congress would have the power to set
up a body to replace the Cabinet and
to function with the Vice President.
The members of the Cabinet would
be a better group to handle a case of
Presidential inability than any other
proposed group (e.g., the Supreme
Court, Congress, or a disability com-
mission) for several reasons. Since
they owe their appointments to the
President, they would not be likely to
take steps to have him declared dis-
abled unless he actually were disabled.
These persons work closely with the
President and meet with him frequent-
ly. Consequently, they would be aware
of his condition and of whether there
was a need for an Acting President.
Finally, since they have come to be
considered an integral part of the
executive machinery, their use is har-
monious with the fundamental principle
of separation of powers.
The involvement of the Vice Presi-
dent is proper. He is the person who
would have to act as President. There-
fore, he should have a say in determin-
ing when to act. The fact that his ap.
proval is necessary before a President
can be declared disabled is an addi-
tional safeguard in favor of the Presi-
dent. As the only other nationally
elected official and a person with politi.
cal aspirations of his own, the Vice
President would not give his approval
except in a case of true inability.
Under Section 4, if a President were
declared disabled, the Vice President
would become Acting President for the
period of the inability. The President
could announce his own recovery but
he then would have to wait four days
before he could resume his powers and
duties. In the meantime, the Vice Pres.
ident and Cabinet would have an op-
portunity to discuss the situation. If
the Vice President and a majority of
the Cabinet disagreed with the Presi.
dent, they would send a written dec-
laration of that fact to the President
pro tempore and Speaker. However, if
they agreed with the President, the
President would assume his powers and
duties at the end of four days, or earlier
if all agreed.
In a case in which the Vice President
and Cabinet disagreed with the Presi-
dent, the issue would be referred to
Congress for a final decision. If Con-
gress were not in session, it would have
to assemble within forty-eight hours
from the time the Vice President and
Cabinet transmitted their declaration
to the President pro tempore and
Speaker. From the time of the trans-
mittal Congress would have twenty-one
days in which to decide ,the issue s
Pending the decision, the Vice Presi-
dent would continue as Acting Presi-
dent so that the powers and duties of
President would never be in the hands
of a person whose capacity had been
seriously challenged. If Congress failed
to arrive at a decision within the given
period, or if more than one third of
either House sided with the President,
the President would resume his powers
and duties. If two thirds of both
Houses supported the Vice President
and Cabinet, the Vice President would
continue as Acting President.9
The presence of Congress as final
arbiter is a built-in safeguard against
what is sometimes referred to as the
possibility of intrigue or cabal by the
Vice President and Cabinet vis-A-vis
the President. The President is given
the opportunity for a speedy review of
any action by the Vice President or
Cabinet. Other safeguards are that the
proposed amendment embodies checks
on all concerned.
It may be asked how this proposed
amendment would have worked during
the disabilities of Presidents Garfield,
Wilson and Eisenhower. It is suggested
that the provisions of Section 3 would
have applied during the Garfield and
Eisenhower situations. The Wilson
case is more difficult to answer.10 It is
possible that the Cabinet might have
prevailed on Mrs. Wilson and Dr. Cary
Grayson to have Wilson voluntarily
turn over his power to Vice President
Marshall. However, Wilson's determi-
nation to have the United States parti-
cipate in the League of Nations and the
nature of his inability likely would
have prevented him from voluntarily
relinquishing his power, and Section 4
probably would have been imple-
mented.
No one claims that this proposed
amendment is perfect or that it covers
every possible contingency. No such
claim was made on behalf of the Con-
stitution itself. As Benjamin Franklin
said in asking for approval of the
A graduate of Fordham College
(B.S. 1958) and of Fordham Law
School (LL.B. 1961), John D.
Feerick practices with a New York
City law firm. A student of the
Presidential inability problem, he
is the author of From Failing
Hands, The Story of Presidential
Succession (Fordham University
Press, 1965).
Constitution: "I agree to this Constitu-
tion with all its faults ... because I
doubt ... whether any other conven-
tion we can obtain may be able to
make a better Constitution." The pro-
posed Twenty-Fifth Amendment is the
best obtainable measure for handling a
case of Presidential inability and a
Vice-Presidential vacancy. It is a wor-
thy measure, is desperately needed and
deserves to be ratified promptly. 1
S. The time limitation is the product of the
Republican members of the House Judiciary
Committee (principally Representatives Wil-
liam M. McCulloch and Richard H. Polf) who
felt that the Senate version of the measure
requiring Congress "immediately" to proceed
to decide the issue was too vague. Congress,
they argued, might take an unreasonably long
period of time to reach a decision or reach
none at all. Such delay would be fraught with
peril because of the critical nature of the mat-
ter under discussion. A twenty-one day provi-
sion was agreed upon by a conference com-
mittee as a reasonable outside limit on Con-
gressional consideration. It is believed, how-
ever, that Congress would act swiftly under
the circumstances, and public opinion would
demand such action.
9. The President could thereafter set Section
4 In motion by another written declaration of
recovery.
10. For a good account of the Wilson inabili-
ty, see SMITH, WHEN THE C:EERING STOPPED
(1964).
11. The proposed amendment has been rati-
fied (as of September 15, 1965) by Wisconsin,
Nebraska, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania and Mas-
sachusetts. Since many legislatures wilt not
be in session in 1966, the proposal is not likely
to be ratified by the necessary thirty-eight
state legislatures until early in 1967.
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